The division of Europe between East and West, so soon after the trauma of the Second World War, secured the future of the 麻豆社 language services to Europe, which until then had been in doubt. The failure of Britain, America and France to agree a post-war settlement with their former ally, and the Soviet Union鈥檚 control over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe made broadcasting a vital tool of influence in the emerging Cold War.
On 8 January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, described for the benefit of his Cabinet colleagues the new reality they faced in Europe:
"It must be recognised that the Soviet Government has formed a solid political and economic block behind a line running from the Baltic along the Oder, through Trieste to the Black Sea. There is no prospect in the immediate future that we shall be able to re-establish normal relations with European countries behind that line."
Editorially independent but funded by a government Grant-in-Aid administered by the Foreign Office, how should the 麻豆社鈥檚 External Services, which broadcast in over twenty languages to Europe, respond to this strategic challenge? As in the Second World War, it was quickly realised that broadcasting would have a vital part to play in 鈥渓etting in daylight from the whole of the outside world鈥�. This was explained in a 麻豆社 memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Committee responsible for Britain鈥檚 overseas information policy in 1950.
"The Overseas Services of the 麻豆社 provide one of the most effective instruments for use by this country in maintaining the stability of the free world in the present struggle with Russian Communism. This struggle, often called the 鈥淐old War鈥�, seems likely to be long. It cannot be won quickly, though it might quickly be lost."
The communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June and the subsequent allied airlift publicly demonstrated the growing antagonism between East and West. As the idea of a 鈥渃old war鈥� became a reality, so the 麻豆社鈥檚 rhetoric in broadcasts over the Iron Curtain hardened. However, despite Foreign Office objections, the Director of External Services at the time, Ian Jacob, was adamant that this should not be used as an excuse to avoid reporting controversy at home in overseas output.
"Conflicting opinions which have serious backing in this country should be allowed expression in proportion to the weight of this backing. Apparent contradictions that may arise from presenting these views helps to demonstrate the tolerance which is a cardinal feature of British democracy."
While 麻豆社 foreign language broadcasting had begun before the Second World War, a 麻豆社 Russian Service wasn鈥檛 launched until 1946. But where the Foreign Office pressed for hard-hitting broadcasts in Russian programmes, attacking and denouncing the actions of the Soviet Union and its propaganda activities, the 麻豆社 resisted, warning against 鈥渢hinking too exclusively in terms of counter-propaganda鈥�.
This dispute came to a head in the pages of The Spectator magazine in 1957, involving accusations that the 麻豆社鈥檚 inability to 鈥榦ffend totalitarian susceptibilities鈥� made the Russian Service a 鈥榥otorious waster of time鈥�. What followed were a series of letters, from a number of academics and Soviet scholars, echoing the views of the Foreign Office and criticising the 麻豆社 for being far too sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The focus of their displeasure was the Head of the Russian Service, Anatol Goldberg, as his successor Alexander Lieven explains in this clip from the 麻豆社 Oral History Collection.
In his broadcasts Goldberg spoke to listeners as a 鈥渄isillusioned friend鈥�, but in the face of this criticism he was removed from running the Russian Service and became, less controversially, its Chief Commentator continuing as the most celebrated of the 麻豆社鈥檚 broadcasters behind the Iron Curtain.
Soviet jamming of Russian language broadcasts began in 1949, extending to all Central and Eastern European services the following year. This presented the 麻豆社 with a fundamental problem: could anyone hear its programmes?
Evidence of audiences behind the Iron Curtain was notoriously hard to get. By 1951, a 麻豆社 audience research report noted that 鈥渘o hard evidence of continued listening鈥� had reached the 麻豆社 that year. Yet, the chance that some broadcasts got through offered sufficient hope to continue. However, as Alexander Lieven noted, beating the Soviet jammers became something of a game of cat and mouse.
The politically sensitive nature of broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet Union continued to have an impact on editorial decision-making. This was the case following the defection to the West of Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin鈥檚 daughter, in 1967.
A decision was taken to broadcast a long 鈥渓etter鈥� she had written after her defection (which had been published in Atlantic Monthly), comparing her own experience with the characters in Boris Pasternak鈥檚 Doctor Zhivago. But, as the Head of East European Services Maurice Latey describes, its broadcast coincided with an emergency visit to Moscow by the British Foreign Secretary.
It was left to the Head of the Russian Service, Alexander Lieven, to read an on-air statement explaining why the 麻豆社 had decided to postpone the broadcast of Svetlana Alliluyeva. Lieven, however, refused to present this as a 麻豆社 decision and instead explained that it was being postponed 鈥渙n the instructions of the British government鈥�. It was a potentially career-ending risk but, as he notes in this interview, it was for him 鈥渁 matter of principle鈥�.
The autonomy granted overseas staff was, in the early years of the Cold War, fairly limited. Even the job title of 鈥楾ranslator/Announcer鈥� indicated their dependency on other parts of the External Services machine. News and most current affairs were produced centrally and distributed for use in the language sections, whereas there was greater scope to develop 鈥楩eatures鈥� within services, if there was the capacity to do so.
However, the arrival of a new generation of international staff from Central and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s led 麻豆社 management to consider how working practices could be adapted to take advantage of the quality and dynamism of this new cadre. As Peter Udell, Controller of European Services, recalls, it required the language services to stop simply being 鈥渢ranslating machines鈥� and generate more original output.
It was a similar experience for Elisabeth Robson-Elliot, working in the 麻豆社 Russian Service at the time. Moreover, it wasn鈥檛 just a top-down exercise: there was pressure from new staff who expected to behave as any other journalist in the 麻豆社.
This was an important change in the culture of overseas broadcasting that characterised the activities of the 麻豆社 External Services, collectively known from 1988 as the 麻豆社 World Service, in the later years of the Cold War. It also reflected the evolving nature of broadcasting over the Iron Curtain and the shifting geopolitical, editorial and cultural contexts through which the 麻豆社 operated. But to what effect was all this effort made? For the Head of the Polish Section, Eugeniusz Smolar, it was about challenging Soviet hegemony and providing a different world view:
"We represented the quality, the fairness, the openness and, most important, we represented the alternative. When the communists wanted to persuade everybody there is no alternative, there was. The alternative was us."
Written by Dr. Alban Webb, University of Sussex.